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I. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS
A. Issue*
Self-represented defendants in international war crimes trials have created serious
problems in the courtroom. In the course of acting as their own counsel, some selfrepresented defendants have greatly slowed the trial process, required extensive
assistance, abused witnesses, launched into irrelevant political speech and disparaged the
court. This memo addresses the extent of the international right to self-representation in
war crimes trials, and what limitations may pertain to its application.
B. Summary of Conclusions
1. The right to self-representation in adversarial international war
crimes trials is almost universally acknowledged and constitutes
customary international law.
The criminal defendant’s right to self-representation is well established in
international law. Defendants have represented themselves before major international
war crimes tribunals, including the International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia (“ICTY”)1 and the Special Court for Sierra Leone (“SCSL”)2. The founding
statutes of these courts contain language interpreted as asserting a right to selfrepresentation, as does Article 67 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court
*

As for self-representation in the International Criminal Court, is there an
international right to self-representation in war crimes trials, or should defense
counsel be imposed from the outset of the trial at the ICC? How should the
ICC deal with a defendant-lawyer who uses self-representation to disrupt the
orderly trial proceedings?

1

Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No. IT-02-54-T, Dec. 7, 2004, “Decision on Assigned Counsel’s Motion
for Withdrawal” (Defendant Milosevic defended himself until his ill health caused the court to impose
counsel on him) [Reproduced in Accompanying Notebook at Tab 31]
2

Prosecutor v. Norman, Case No. SCSL-2004-14-T, June 14, 2004 [Reproduced in Accompanying
Notebook at Tab 36]

1

(“ICC”).3 Domestic laws of many common-law countries guarantee this right; thirty-three
countries proclaim a right to self-representation unambiguously in their constitutions, and
many more countries respect a right to self-representation without an explicit
constitutional mandate.4 Regional human rights treaties and conventions, such as Article
8(2)(d) of the American Convention on Human Rights (“ACHR”),5 Article 6(3) of the
European Convention on Human Rights (“ECHR”),6 and the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”),7 acknowledge a right to self-representation in
criminal trials. Also, the Human Rights Committee has ruled that denial of a defendant’s
right to self-representation can be a violation of the ICCPR.8 Collectively, this evidence
establishes that a right to self-representation in adversarial criminal trials is customary
international law.
2. The right to self-representation in international war crimes trials is
not absolute.
While the right to self-representation is nearly universally acknowledged,
international tribunals and domestic courts alike have conceded that it is not absolute.
3

Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, Article 67, UN Doc.
A/CONF.183/9*(1998), 37 ILM 999 (1998) [Reproduced in Accompanying Notebook at Tab 6]
4

M Cherif Bassiouni, Human Rights in the Context of Criminal Justice: Identifying International
Procedural Protections and Equivalent Protections in National Constitutions, 3 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L.
235, 284 (1993) [Reproduced in Accompanying Notebook at Tab 40]

5

American Convention on Human Rights, opened for signature Nov. 22, 1969, Art. 8(2)(d), 114 UNTS
123 (entered into force July 18, 1978). [Reproduced in Accompanying Notebook at Tab 1]
6

European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, Art. 6(3), 213 UNTS
222 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1953), as amended by Protocol No. 11, May 11, 1994, ETS No. 155, 33
ILM 943 (1994) [Reproduced in Accompanying Notebook at Tab 3]
7

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature December 16, 1966, G.A. res.
2200A (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No.16) at 52 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976) [Reproduced in
Accompanying Notebook at Tab 5]

8

Hill v. Spain, Human Right Commission, Communication No. 526/1993(04/02/1997) [Reproduced in
Accompanying Notebook at Tab 23]

2

The ICTY noted that “the right to self-representation is a qualified, not an absolute,
right”.9
a. There is debate over the statutory intent and correct
interpretation of key self-representation passages in
treaties, conventions and the statutes that created
international tribunals.
There is a textual debate over whether the oft-used phraseology “to represent
himself in person or be represented by counsel of his own choosing” presents a binary
and mutually exclusive choice. If the choice if mutually exclusive, there is further debate
as to who gets to make the binary choice. If the choice is not mutually exclusive, there is
discussion regarding how a defendant may both be assigned counsel and represent
himself in his trial.10
There is also a debate over the legislative intent in creating such phraseology,
especially as regards the drafting of the ICCPR.11
b. Categorical exceptions undermine the fundamentality
of the right to self-representation.
Some of the same common-law countries that so esteem the right to selfrepresentation also carve out specific categorical exceptions to the right. In Scotland, the

9

Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No. IT-02-54-T, Dec. 7, 2004 (“Decision on Assigned Counsel’s Motion
for Withdrawal”) para. 22 [Reproduced in Accompanying Notebook at Tab 31] and cited by Nina
Jorgensen, Current Developments: The Right of the Accused to Self-Representation Before International
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia: Further Developments, 99 AM. J. INT’L. L. 663 (2005),
[hereinafter “Current Developments”], [Reproduced in Accompanying Notebook at Tab 38].
10

GIDEON BOAS, “The Right to Self-Representation in International and Domestic Criminal LawLimitations and Qualifications on that Right” in BELLIGERENT REPRISALS at 58 (2006) [Reproduced in
Accompanying Notebook at Tab 52]
11

Michael P. Scharf, Christopher M. Rassi, Do Former Leaders Have An International Right to SelfRepresentation In War Crimes Trials?, 20 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 3 (2005) [Reproduced in
Accompanying Notebook at Tab 11].

3

defendant in a sexual crime case is not allowed to represent himself in court.12 In the
United States, defendants are not allowed to represent themselves on appeal.13 Many
other countries have categorical exceptions, and this tendency to limit self-representation
undermines the fundamentality of the right, since it can be categorically swept aside in
favor of judicial effectiveness or witness sensitivity.
c. There are at least four circumstances that can justify
the imposition of counsel upon the defendant in a war
crimes trial: defendant incapacity, defendant
obstructionism, threat to interests of other defendants,
and jeopardy of court integrity.
A court may impose some form of counsel upon a defendant who is incapable of
adequately conducting his own defense, if needed to protect the integrity of the court or
the fairness of the trial. When ICTY defendant Milosevic’s illness worsened, the court
appointed counsel against the defendant’s will.14 Milosevic’s health needs hampered the
trial process and slowed the proceedings to a near standstill.15
A court may also curtail a defendant’s right to self-representation if the defendant
engages in consistently obstructionist behavior. The specific behavioral threshold that
would justify this imposition is not clearly defined. In the domestic case of United States
v. Williams, a court held that the defendant’s behavior must be more than “bizarre” to
trigger the imposition of counsel, and that the behavior must include an intentional

12

Criminal Procedure Act of Scotland (1995) as amended by the Sexual Offences (Procedure and
Evidence) Act (Scotland) (2002) [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 2].

13

Boas, supra [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 52].

14

Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Decision on Appeal of Assigned Counsel’s Motion for Withdrawal, No. IT-0254-T, para. 22 (Dec. 7, 2004), [Hereinafter “Counsel Motion for Withdrawal”], [Reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 31].

15

Id.

4

disregard for the rules of the court.16 A recent ruling in Prosecutor v. Seselj greatly
defers to trial court discretion.17 Counsel has been imposed upon obstructionist
defendants in the ICTY case of Prosecutor v. Jankovic18 and in the domestic case United
States v. Brock,19 among others.
The right to self-representation can be curtailed if the failure to impose counsel
upon the defendant will otherwise compromise the integrity of the court, endanger
witnesses, or imperil the fairness of the trials of co-defendants or defendants in other
trials.20 The court has responsibilities to more than just the one defendant.
3. If circumstances trigger the court to restrict a defendant’s right to
self-representation, the defendant is not necessarily reduced to a
passive role in his or her defense, but retains some power in the
planning, strategy and execution of his or her case.
The defendant is not reduced to a passive role when counsel is imposed upon him
or her, but generally retains control over the direction and strategy of his or her case. The
defendant may even retain the right to address the court, the witnesses, and to submit
documents. He might just lose the right to perform these tasks exclusively, or the court
might just want standby counsel to take over when the defendant is being uncooperative.

16

Prosecutor v Seselj, (“Decision on Assignment of Counsel”), supra [Reproduced in accompanying
notebook at Tab 27] quoting United States v. Williams, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 32715 (10th Cir. 1999),
[Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 17].
17

Prosecutor v. Seselj, Case No. IT-03-67-PT, (“Decision on Appeal Against the Trial Chamber’s Decision
on Assignment of Counsel”) (Oct. 20, 2006) (hereinafter “Counsel Appeal”) [Reproduced in accompanying
notebook at Tab #].

18

Prosecutor v. Jankovic, (“Decision on Defence Counsel”), para 74-79 [Reproduced in accompanying
notebook at Tab 35].

19

United States v Brock, 159 F.3d 1077, 1080-1 (7th Cir. 1998) [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at
Tab 15].

20

Prosecutor v. Norman, supra, [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 36].

5

4

The potential for abuse of the court does not disappear
when counsel is imposed upon the defendant.

The accused retains some power in the direction and content of his or her case, even
after counsel has been imposed. In some courts, the accused may still submit documents,
address the court, or question witnesses.21 In fulfilling these roles, the defendant may
still be able to engage in obstructionist behavior.22 Additionally, the defendant may
cause difficulties for the court by refusing to communicate or cooperate with his assigned
counselor, even to the point that the fairness of his trial is compromised.23

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
High-profile defendants in international war crimes trials have chosen to represent
themselves in court without legal counsel, and in the execution of their defense, have
sometimes caused serious problems for the courts. These trial problems have related to
the defendant’s incapacity to effectively interact with the court and follow the ground
rules of procedure, or the defendant’s engagement in obstructionist behavior and
unwillingness to submit to the rules of the court.
Obstructionist behavior or incapable defense can jeopardize the integrity of an entire
trial. The extent of damage possible is apparent when looking at the example of Seselj, a
defendant at the ICTY. He used his right to self-defense to obstruct the court and
interrupt the orderly proceedings of the trial. He did this by harassing witnesses, making

21

Nina Jorgensen , Note and Comment: The Right of the Accused to Self-Representation Before
International Criminal Tribunals, 98 AM. J. INT’L. L. 711 (2004) at 723-4 (hereinafter “Note and
Comment”) [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 37].

22

Id.

23

Id.

6

irrelevant speeches, making offensive remarks regarding the court and judges, and by
submitting bizarre documents to the court.24
For example, Seselj took repetitive issue with the traditional garb of the judges,
declaring that the robes were reminiscent of the Catholic Inquisition or the uniforms of
Nazi SS soldiers25. He went so far as to address the court as follows: “My EEG shows
nervousness of the heart caused by the frustrations and the psychological sufferings I am
undergoing looking at your robes…. I have lost 18 kilogrammes because of my
psychological frustration due to your robes, I don’t know how else to explain it.”26 He
would not set aside this complaint even after multiple declarations by the judge that the
judicial attire would not change.27 The court wasted time to deal with this irrelevant
issue. Seselj also rebuked the authority of the court, and refused to cooperate, declaring
that he had “no intention whatsoever of submitting” required documents.28
Seselj took direct and personal aim at the officers of the court, and at the court itself.
He wrote books with titles like, “Genocidal Israeli Diplomat Theodor Meron”, “In the
Jaws of the Whore Del Ponte”, and “The Lying Hague Homosexual, Geoffrey Nice”.29
He submitted documents that advised members of “the Hague Tribunal Registry [that

24

Prosecutor v. Seselj, “Decision on Assignment of Counsel”) supra [reproduced in accompanying
notebook at Tab 27].

25

Id. at 13453

26

Id.

27

Transcript quote of the defendant at a Status Conference on October 4th, 2004, as quoted in Prosecutor v.
Seselj, “Decision on Assignment of Counsel”, supra at 13453, [reproduced in accompanying notebook at
Tab 27].
28

Id. at 13451

29

Id. at 13454

7

they] can only accept to suck my cock” and composed other, similarly offensive
documents for admission to the court.30
Perhaps most alarmingly, Seselj sent confidential documents to outside experts
without court permission.31 This was a security concern, as access to the documents was
restricted in order to protect the witnesses. Seselj maintained that he had the power to
disclose the documents to whomever he wished.32 With these actions, Seselj endangered
more than the integrity of the court or the trial, he may have endangered the safety of the
witnesses.
Other examples abound. Saddam Hussein made a spectacle of his trial by engaging
in obstructionist behavior and screaming offensive remarks at the judges.33 ICTY
defendant Slobodan Milosevic also used his trial as a forum for irrelevant and
obstructionist political speech.34
Incapacity of the defendant to execute his own defense can also be destructive to the
proceedings. Milosevic’s self-representation slowed his trial substantially because he
was too ill to work on his trial full-time, costing the trial 66 trial days and eventually
reducing the trial to three days per week.35

30

Id. at 13450

31

Id.

32

Id. at 13448

33

Ahmed Rasheed, Judge Ejects Saddam from Baghdad Court, REUTERS, Oct. 10, 2006 [Reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 57].

34

Michael Scharf and Christopher Rassi, Do Former Leaders Have An International Right to SelfRepresentation in War Crimes Trials?, 20 OHIO ST. J. ON DIP. RESOL. 3 (2005) at 4, [Reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 46].
35

Boas, supra at 72, [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 52], quoting Prosecution v. Slobodan
Milosevic, Reasons for Decision on Assignment of Defence Counsel, Case No. IT-02-54-T, (Sept. 22,
2004), [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 30]

8

Courts are struggling to deal with such defendants. If a defendant is able to slow the
trial to a standstill, mock the judge regularly, and harass or endanger the witnesses, that
defendant has the power to imperil the whole integrity of the court. It is doubtful that the
result of such a trial would be meaningful. On the other hand, the integrity of a trial can
also be damaged when defendants are deprived of essential rights. If self-representation
is a fundamental right, it is perilous to the integrity of the court to disregard it. In
defining the limitations of the right to self-representation, courts are trying to address and
balance these concerns.

III.

LEGAL DISCUSSION
A. There is a universal right to self-representation in adversarial
international war crimes trials.
According to M. Cherif Bassiouni, 65 countries’ domestic constitutions impliedly

recognize a right to self-representation, and the constitutions of another 33 countries
directly guarantee this right.36 In the U.S., for example, the Supreme Court held (in
Faretta v. California) 37 that a defendant in a criminal trial has a constitutional right to
self-representation, implied in the Sixth Amendment of the Constitution of the United
States.38
Even when a right to self-representation is not found in a country’s constitution,
the country may still offer criminal self-representation to its defendants as a rule of court
procedure or other law. Many domestic courts around the world recognize a right to self-

36

M. Cherif Bassiouni, supra at 284, [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 40].

37

Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975), [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 12].

38

U.S. CONST. art. VI [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 11].

9

representation for criminal defendants, especially courts in nations that have adversarial
trial systems39. Regional human rights conventions, like the ECHR40 and supranational
human right treaties and conventions, such as the ICCPR41 also recognize this right.
International war crimes tribunals reference the right to self-representation in their
statutes and case histories, and the Rome Statute of the ICC42 also contains this language.
Finally, the Human Right Committee has recognized a right to self-representation in its
case history.43 Collectively, these sources provide strong evidence that the right to selfrepresentation, at least within adversarial-style proceedings, is customary international
law.

1. Self-Representation has been more venerated in adversarial
common law traditions than in inquisitorial civil law
traditions, and while international war crimes trials include
elements of both traditions, they are more adversarial than
inquisitorial in nature.
Self-representation is as old as criminal trials themselves, but over time a
recognition that appointed counsel could benefit the defendant and the court led to laws
requiring the availability of counsel, even when the defendant cannot afford an attorney.
This preference for counsel-represented defendants led to compulsory representation in
many civil law countries, or systems of inquisitorial trial procedures.44 In adversarial

40

ECHR statute, supra [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 3]

41

ICCPR Statute, supra at 14(3) [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 5].

42

Rome Statute, supra [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 6].

43

Hill v. Spain, Human Rights Committee, Communication No.526/1993, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/59/D/526/1993, (April 2, 1997) [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 23].
44

Boas, supra at 40-42 [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 52].
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trial systems on the other hand, such, self-representation was retained as an option for
defendants, even though it was widely considered that the defendant would be better off
if represented by counsel.45
There is an underlying divergence of emphasis between the two court systems,
with civil law traditions focusing upon protecting the interests of the defendant and the
court, and common law traditions focusing on honoring the freewill of the defendant.
Gideon Boas asserts that, “the two differ profoundly in their treatment of the issue,
logically divided by the different premises which underlie their systems of law”.46
Both common law and civil law traditions are of interest to international war
crimes tribunals, because the tribunals utilize elements of both traditions. War crimes
trials “apply neither the common law nor the civil law in their practice. They represent
procedurally what might be termed a ‘third way’”.47 But though war crimes courts have
been composed with elements of both traditions, they are adversarial in many ways.
a. In civil law traditions, the emphasis has been upon a fair
trial and good guardianship of the defendant, and laws
have evolved to require counsel in high-stakes criminal
trials.
Some civil law countries, such as the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, grant the
right to self-representation only to defendants who are accused of crimes of lesser
severity, such as crimes that involve more than ten years of prison.48 The higher the
stakes, the more likely that an inquisitorial trial system will require counsel.
45

Id.

46

Id. at 40

47

Id. at 41

48

Nina Jorgensen, “Note and Comment”, supra at 715 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 37].
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France has a similar system. The French Code of Criminal Procedure requires
that counsel must represent every defendant who has been charged with a “serious”
offense.49
Germany’s procedure is similar to that of France. The Code of Criminal
Procedure of Germany requires counsel for all defendants “charged with a serious
criminal offense”.50
Other civil law countries have similar provisions, requiring counsel for all
defendants faced with serious charges. In Spain and Norway, for example, counsel must
represent the accused unless the crime charged could not result in a sentence of jail
time.51
b. In common law countries, the emphasis has been upon
the freewill of the defendant, and laws have evolved that
allow the defendant to choose whether or not to accept
legal assistance.
Traditionally, common law countries have valued a defendant’s right to selfrepresentation highly, but increasingly, these same countries have been restricting the
right and weighing it against other responsibilities of the court.
In the United States, self-representation was a privilege granted by the judge to
the defendant until 1975, when Faretta v. California52 proved that the defendant should
make that choice. The US Supreme Court found that the criminal defendant’s right to

49

Boas, supra at 51 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 52].

50

Id.

51

Id.

52

Prosecutor v. Seselj, supra at 13459, “Decision on Assignment of Counsel” [Reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 27], quoting Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, (1975) [Reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 12].
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self-representation is implied in the Sixth Amendment of the Constitution of the United
States.53
The right to self-representation has prevailed in common law countries, even
where the courts felt that self-representation was not in the defendant’s best interest. In
Faretta v. California, the U.S. Supreme Court held that self-representation was a right
that had been respected by the courts even before the country’s birth.54 The defendant’s
right to waive all counsel and represent himself in trial was obeyed in the Ninth Circuit
case US v. Farhad, but not without some expression of reservation.55 Judge Reinhardt
noted that the self-represented defendant “was convicted in a proceeding so
fundamentally flawed that, were it not for Faretta, it would undoubtedly offend even
minimal constitutional standards of fairness”.56
c. International war crimes trials are more adversarial than
inquisitorial in nature.
Judge Robinson, who presided over the Milosevic case at the ICTY, described the
tribunal as “primarily or essentially adversarial,” although he noted that, “it is not
entirely adversarial” and borrows some elements from inquisitorial law.57 The structure
of the ICTY is similar to that of other war crimes tribunals. While international war
crimes courts do borrow from both traditions, the weight of the adversarial-system
influence favors the adoption of adversarial-system safeguards.

53

Faretta v. California, supra [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 12]

54

Id.

55

United States v. Farhad, 190 F.3d 1097 (1999) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 34].
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Id.

57

Boas, supra, p 56-57 [Reproduced in Accompanying Notebook at Tab 52]
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2. International human rights treaties and conventions
recognize a right of the accused to defend himself in person.
The ECHR, the ACHR and the ICCPR all contain provisions that reference an
accused’s right to self-representation.
The ECHR (Art. 6(3))58 and the ACHR (Art. 8(2)(d))59 both include a right of the
accused to defend himself in person “or” to be assisted by legal counsel. The ECHR
states that a defendant holds the right “to defend himself in person or through legal
assistance of his own choosing.”60 The ACHR contains comparable language,
recognizing a right “of the accused to defend himself personally or to be assisted by legal
counsel of his own choosing”.61
The final draft of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(“ICCPR”), ratified in 1976 and followed by 160 parties, contains a provision
guaranteeing a right of self-representation. Article 14(3) of the ICCPR pledges to the
accused the right “to defend himself in person or through legal assistance.”62

3. The statutes that created international war crimes tribunals
and the International Criminal Court have recognized the
right to self-representation, as have the cases decided by
these courts.

The statutes that created major international war crimes tribunals such as the
ICTR, ICTY, SCSL, the Charter that governed the Nuremberg trials, and the statute that
58

ECHR, supra at Article 6(3) [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 3].

59

ACHR, supra at Article 8(2)(d) [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 1].

60

ECHR supra [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 3].

61

ACHR supra [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 1].

62

ICCPR, supra [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 5].
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created the ICC, all recognize a defendant’s right to self-representation. The ICTY
declared a right to self-representation in Article 21(4)(d) of its founding statute, where it
is stated that the accused has the right to “defend himself in person or through legal
assistance of his own choosing”.63 The ICTR contains identical language in Article
20(4)(d) of its founding statute.64 Similarly, the Statute for the SCSL outlined a right to
self-representation in Article 17(d)(4) of its founding statute.65 Article 16 of the Charter
that governed the Nuremberg trials also defined a right to self-representation. 66
a. The ICTY recognizes a defendant’s right to selfrepresentation.
The Statute of the ICTY references a right to self-defense for the defendant in a
criminal trial in its Article 21. The article declares that the defendant has the right to
“defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing.”67
This provision has been recognized in ICTY case history as signifying a right to
self-representation for criminal defendants. In Prosecutor v. Milosevic, the ICTY held
that defendants “have the presumptive right to represent themselves notwithstanding a

63

Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, SC Res. 827, annex, Art. 20(1)
(May 25, 1993), (hereinafter “Statute for the ICTY”)[Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 8].

64

Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, SC Res. 955, annex, Art. 20(4)(d) (Nov. 8,
1994), [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 9].

65

Statute for the Special Court for Sierra Leone, Article 17(d)(4), [Reproduced in accompanying notebook
at Tab 7].

66

“Charter of the International Military Tribunal”, Article 16(d) (1945), VIRGINIA MORRIS AND MICHAEL
SCHARF, INSIDER’S GUIDE TO THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL OF THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA,
(1995) at 681 [Reproduced at Tab 53]
67

Statute of the ICTY, supra at Article 21, [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 8].
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Trial Chamber’s judgment that they would be better off if represented by counsel.”68 The
court further analyzed the Statute by stating that:
The drafter of the Statute clearly viewed the right to self-representation as an
indispensable cornerstone of justice, placing it on a structural par with defendants’
right to remain silent, to confront witnesses against them, to a speedy trial, and
even to demand a court-appointed attorney if they cannot afford one themselves.69
b. The ICTR recognizes a defendant’s right to selfrepresentation.
The ICTR Statute’s Article 20 describes a defendant’s right to self representation
in language that is identical to that used in the ICTY.

c. The SCSL Statute also declares that a defendant has a
right to self-representation.
The Statute of the SCSL provides a right to self-representation in Article 17(d)(4).
Article 17 includes the right of the defendant to “be tried in his or her presence, and to
defend himself or herself in person or through legal assistance of his or her own
choosing” among the “minimum guarantees” to which the defendant is entitled.70 In
Prosecutor v. Norman, the SCSL Trial Chamber held that “as a matter of statutory
construction, Article 17(4)(d) does guarantee to an accused person, first and foremost, the
right to self-representation”.71

68

Prosecutor v. Seselj, “Decision on Assignment of Counsel”, supra [Reproduced in Accompanying
Notebook at Tab 27] citing Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No. IT-02-54-T, (“Decision on Interlocutory
Appeal of the Trial Chamber’s Decision on the Assignment of Defence Counsel”), (November 1, 2004)
[Hereinafter “Milosevic Interlocutory Appeal”], [Reproduced in Accompanying Notebook at Tab 32]
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d. The Rome Statute that created the International Criminal
Court (“ICC”) recognizes a defendant’s right to selfrepresentation.
The Rome Statute, which created the ICC, uses language that is very similar to
those references to the right to self-representation expressed in the ICTY, ICTR and
SCSL statutes. Article 67 of the Rome Statute declares that a defendant may “conduct
[his] defence in person or through legal assistance of the accused’s choosing”.72
e. The Charter of the historic tribunal at Nuremberg also
recognized a defendant’s right to self-representation.
The historic Nuremberg Trials, which predate and inform all the modern
international war crimes tribunals, were governed by similar language. Article 16 of the
Nuremberg charter guarantees “a defendant shall have the right to conduct his own
defense before the Tribunal or to have the assistance of counsel.”73
4. The case history of the Human Rights Committee recognizes
a right to self-representation.
The right to self-representation played a pivotal role in the Human Rights
Committee case Hill v. Spain.74 Hill’s request to represent himself in a Spanish court was
denied. Spain argued that the ICCPR right to self-representation was inconsistent with
Spanish court tradition. Spain was found in violation of the ICCPR for denying Hill his
right to self-representation.75

72

Rome Statute, Article 67, supra [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 6].

73

“Charter of the International Military Tribunal”, supra [Reproduced in Accompanying Notebook at 53]
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Hill v, Spain, supra, [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 23].
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B. The right to self-representation in international war crimes trials is
not absolute, and counsel may be imposed upon the accused in some
circumstances.
The right to self-representation in international war crimes trials is not absolute, and
can be abridged if the defendant is not capable of executing his or her defense, if the
defendant’s obstructionist behavior damages the court’s integrity, or if the failure to
impose counsel upon the defendant will result in an unfair trial for the defendant or other
defendants.
The courts weigh the defendant’s right to self-representation against what the ICTY
calls its “fundamental duty” to provide a fair and expeditious trial.76 In Prosecutor v.
Milosevic, the ICTY observed, “ assignment of counsel against the wishes of the accused
is a developing area of the law both in national and international jurisdictions”77, but
though ambiguity exists, the ICTY was at least unanimous in recognizing that “the right
to self-representation is a qualified, not an absolute, right.”78
1. There is debate over the legislative intent and textual
interpretation of the language of the ICCPR, suggesting that
it might not lay out an absolute right to self-representation.
There is debate over the significance of the sentence that recognizes a defendant’s
right to defend himself in person “or” have counsel of his choosing. The wording is
found in similar permutations in many statutes.

76

Constantinos Hotis, A “Fair and Expeditious” Trial: A Reappraisal of Slobodan Milosevic’s Right to
Self-Representation before the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 6 CHI. J. INT’L
L. 775, *778 (2006) [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 44].
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Nina Jorgensen, “Current Developments”, supra at 663 [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab
38], quoting Prosecutor v. Milosevic, “Milosevic Counsel Motion for Withdrawal”, supra [Reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 31].
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a. There is debate over the word “or” in the sentences
granting a right to self-representation in the ACHR,
ECHR, ICCPR, and the statutes of the tribunals.
There is debate over the meaning of these two provisions, regarding the
significance of the word “or” in both conventions. The debate centers around whether
the two clauses are mutually exclusive, and if not, whether a defendant can both defend
himself in person and be assisted by court-imposed legal counsel. Even if it is
determined that the two clauses are mutually exclusive, there is debate over who has
ultimate control over the binary choice of self-representation or counsel.
The first debate is whether the word “or” means that the two clauses are mutually
exclusive. If the two clauses are mutually exclusive, the defendant cannot both defend
himself in person and be appointed counsel. In that case, forcing counsel upon the
defendant is more of an imposition, because it rules out self-representation. The
defendant has lost his right. But if the two clauses are not mutually exclusive, then the
imposition is less overwhelming. Counsel can be imposed upon the defendant without
the defendant wholly loosing his right to defend himself in person. So, if the clauses are
not mutually exclusive, the defendant who has been forced to team with a counselor has
not lost his right to self-representation; it has merely been abridged.
The second debate is over whether the defendant or the court has ultimate control
over the choice of whether the accused defends himself in person or is appointed counsel.
b. There is debate over the legislative intent in drafting
Article X of the ICCPR, upon which the other courts have
based their statutes.
There is debate over the ICCPR’s legislative intent, and how important selfrepresentation was to the framers of the covenant. The ICCPR did not contain a provision

19

guaranteeing a right of self-representation to criminal defendants until the Fifth Session
of the Drafting Committee. When the phrase “to defend himself in person or through
legal assistance” was inserted, it was part of a new sentence that guaranteed the defendant
representation even if he could not afford to pay counsel. It was this latter part of the
sentence that was focused upon in the Drafting Committee sessions.79 Michael Scharf
suggests that the lateness and relaxed attitude with which the self-representation language
was added to the covenant show that a right to absolute self-representation was unlikely
foremost in the framers’ minds. 80

2. Categorical exceptions to the right to self-representation exist
even in common law countries that recognize selfrepresentation as an essential right.
The United States does not consider the right to self-representation to apply on
appeal. The US Supreme Court observed, “the government’s interest in ensuring the
integrity and efficiency of the trial at times outweighs the defendant’s interest in acting as
his own lawyer”.81
Sometimes, defendants are denied self-representation based on the nature of the
allegations against them, in the interest of trial integrity and fairness. In Scotland,
defendants may not represent themselves in court if they have been accused of sexual
crimes.82 This restriction is not based on any incapacity of the defendant, or predicated
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Michael Scharf and Christopher Rassi, supra at 11 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 46].
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Martinez v. Court of Appeal of Cal., 528 U.S. 152, 162 (2000) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at
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Section 288C(1) of the Criminal Procedures Act (1995) as amended by the Sexual Offences (Procedure
and Evidence) Act (2002) (Scotland) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 2].
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upon bad courtroom behavior, but rather on the nature of the trial. Presumably, the
legislature wants to avoid direct examination of victims of sexual crimes by their accused
abuser.
Canada restricts the self-representation rights of defendants who have been
accused of sexual crimes against minors.83 Canada observes this qualification even
though it’s Charter of Rights and Freedoms, a part of its Constitution, has been
interpreted as a constitutional guarantee that counsel will not be imposed upon an
unwilling defendant.84 England observes a right to self-representation too, but is similarly
uneasy with the defendant’s personal examination of witnesses in sexual crime trials.85
England goes a step further than Canada, prohibiting the defendant from personally
cross-examining child witnesses to sexual crime, even if those children were not the
defendant’s accuser.86 Scotland goes much further, revoking the right to selfrepresentation in sexual-offense trials altogether.87

3. References to exceptions often accompany assertion of the
right in domestic and international case history.
Faretta v. California, established that criminal defendants have the right to selfrepresentation in American courts, yet the decision admits that the right has limitations.88
It held that counsel must not be imposed upon a qualified defendant, one who is “literate,
83
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competent and understanding” and follows “ground rules” of court procedure.89 It can be
inferred from these two qualifications that the incompetent defendant, or the defendant
who is unwilling to cooperate with the court’s ground rules, may be denied selfrepresentation.
4. There are at least four circumstances that can justify the
abridgement of the defendant’s right to self-representation in
a war crimes trial.

Courts may limit a defendant’s right to represent himself if the defendant is
incapable of mounting a sufficient defense, unwilling to follow court procedures or
otherwise obstructionist, or if the defendant’s self-representation would endanger the
fairness of the trial to co-defendants, defendants in other trials or witnesses.

a. A court may impose counsel upon a defendant who is
incapable of adequately preparing his own defense.
A defendant must be capable of competently executing his defense if he is to
represent himself. This is perhaps the least disputed of the limitations to the right to selfrepresentation. The limitation has been recognized both in domestic trials and trials
before international war crimes tribunals.

Article 21 of the ICTY Statute ensures that a defendant may “defend himself in
person or through legal assistance of his own choosing”.90 As with the ACHR and ECHR
provisions, there is debate about this wording. The debate centers on whether the two
clauses separated by the word “or” are mutually exclusive or not, and if not mutually
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Statute of the ICTY, supra [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 8].
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exclusive, whether the defendant always gets to choose between legal counsel “of his
own choosing” and representing himself.91 The alternative is that he is only promised
that one of the two options will be available to him, and the court makes the decision
whether or not the defendant may act without representation.
Additionally, there is a second provision in the ICTY Statute to consider. Article
20 charges the court with the responsibility for maintaining the trial’s fairness and
expeditiousness, and the protection of the rights of the accused as well as the rights of the
witnesses. 92 This article has been understood as an over-arching authority, against which
other procedural guarantees must be squared.93 For example, a defendant who is wholly
mentally incompetent cannot defend himself without aide of counsel, even if he so
desires, because it would so frustrate the purposes of the trial and jeopardize the fairness
and speediness of the trial. This is not a special exception outlined in the ICTY Statute,
but can be inferred from the court’s duty to ensure an orderly and fair trial, as required by
Article 21.94
When Milosevic’s health deteriorated greatly, the ICTY imposed counsel upon
him. The Appeals Chamber of the ICTY held that the defendant’s right to exclusively
represent himself in court must “yield to the overarching right to a fair trial”, and that the
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66 trial days that had been lost as a result of Milosevic’s poor health were too great an
imposition upon the speediness of the trial for him to continue unaided95.
b. A court may impose counsel upon a defendant if his or
her obstructionist behavior is depriving the tribunal of
integrity, imperiling the fairness of the trial to the
defendant, or jeopardizing the fairness of the trials of
other defendants.
Courts have the authority to revoke a defendant’s right to self-defense when the
defendant’s uncooperative or offensive behavior has been so bad that it endangers the
trial’s integrity. International tribunals and domestic courts have recognized this
authority of the court.
i. International tribunals have revoked a
defendant’s right to self-representation
when the defendant has engaged in
severely obstructionist behavior.
Several high-profile international war crimes trials have been characterized by
obstructionist behavior on the part of the defendant. Milosevic made irrelevant political
speeches.96 Saddam Hussein engaged in tirades against the court and the judges.97 Seselj
wrote insulting court documents, offensive books about officers of the court, and
disparaged witnesses.98 It is clear that at some point, obstructionist behavior can
seriously compromise the integrity of the court, but the specific threshold that would
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justify the court in imposing counsel upon the defendant is not clearly defined in the rules
of any of the international criminal tribunals.
Milosevic lost his right to exclusive self-representation because of his illnessinduced incapacity, not obstructionist behavior, even though his behavior in court was
sometimes alarming. According to Michael Scharf and Christopher Rassi, “Bending over
backward to maintain the appearance of fairness, the Trial Chamber has permitted
Milosevic to treat the witnesses, prosecutors, and themselves in a manner that would earn
ordinary defense counsel expulsion from the courtroom”.99
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The ICTY also dealt with an uncooperative self-represented defendant in
Prosecutor v. Seselj100, but in that case it found that the behavior of the defendant’s
obstructionist behavior went too far, and imposed counsel upon him. The defendant
focused on offensive and irrelevant matter, both in court speech, and in documents, and
continued to disparage when outside court. He attempted to intimidate the witnesses,
discredit the judges, and incite hatred against the attorneys. For example, he referred to
the witnesses as “dirty toilet paper” whom “generations will be unable [to claim as] their
relative” and accused them all of being liars who were blackmailed into testifying by the
court.101 In summary, the court found that the defendant demonstrated “deliberate
disrespect for the rules” and that his behavior “compromise[d] the dignity of the Tribunal
and jeopardize[d] the very foundations upon which its proper functioning is based.”102
The recent developments in the case of Prosecutor v. Seselj confirm that the right
to self-representation can be abridged in the case of obstructionist behavior, and give
concrete parameters for how and when a court may impose counsel upon an
obstructionist defendant.103 Seselj was once a law professor in Belgrade.104 But despite
his capabilities in the courtroom, Seselj engaged in severe obstructionist behavior,
refusing to follow court rules or submit documents, and focusing his efforts on attacking
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Prosecutor v. Seselj, supra, [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 27].

101

Id. at 13446-13445

102

Id. at 13442

103

Prosecutor v. Seselj, “Decision on Appeal Against the Trial Chamber’s Decision on Assignment of
Counsel” supra [Reproduced in Accompanying Notebook at Tab 29]
104

Nina Jorgensen, “Note and Comment”, supra [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 37].

26

the court, judges, lawyers and witnesses.105 Seselj’s behavior prompted the ICTY Trial
Chamber to appoint counsel over the defendant’s objections. The ICTY Appeals
Chamber reversed this decision, but it did so only on the basis that Seselj was not given a
specific warning that his continued obstructionist behavior would lead to the imposition
of counsel upon him. The Appeals Chamber, while reversing the imposition of counsel
upon Seselj on these grounds, nevertheless affirmed that had Seselj been given proper
warning, the court would have been appropriate in imposing counsel upon him. 106

ii. Domestic courts have also revoked the
right to self- representation from
defendants who are deliberately
obstructionist.
Domestic courts have also forced counsel upon the obstructionist criminal
defendant. In the U.S., disruptive behavior led to the curtailment of the defendant’s right
to self-representation in United States v. Brock. In that case, the court found that
defendant Brock’s “refusal to answer the court’s questions” made proceeding in the trial
“extremely difficult” and justified the revocation of the defendant’s right to execute his
own defense.107
In Brock’s predecessor case, Faretta v. California, the court qualified the right to
pro se criminal defense by stating that the “right to self-representation is not a license to
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abuse the dignity of the courtroom” and that deliberate, “serious and obstructionist
misconduct” could result in the appointment of standby counsel.108
c. Counsel may be imposed upon a defendant if allowing
the defendant to represent himself would endanger the
fairness of his trial, or the integrity of the court, even
without a showing of defendant incapacity or
obstructionist behavior.
Courts have the authority to revoke a defendant’s self-representation, independent
of any action or behavior of the defendant. The court has a broader responsibility to
justice and to ensuring a trial of integrity, and can curtail the defendant’s right to selfrepresentation if necessary.
d. Counsel may be imposed upon a defendant if allowing
the defendant to represent himself without counsel
would jeopardize the fairness of the trials of codefendants or other defendants.
The court has responsibility to more than one defendant, and cannot allow one
defendant’s preference for self-representation to jeopardize the fairness of the trial of
codefendants or defendants in other trials.
In Prosecutor v. Norman, the SCSL found that Article 17(4) of the Statute for the
Special Court for Sierra Leone109 did “guarantee to an accused person, first and foremost,
the right to self-representation”110 in the following language: “he or she shall be entitled
to the following minimum guarantees, in full equality…. to be tried in his or her
presence, and to defend himself or herself in person or through legal assistance of his or
108
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her own choosing.”111 Yet the court denied Norman’s petition to represent himself,
because it found that the right was impliedly qualified by another phrase in Article 17
(4)(d), “to have legal assistance assigned to him or her, in any case where the interests of
justice so require.”112 Unlike Milosevic, Norman was joined by codefendants, and the
court felt that his self-representation might imperil the fairness and speediness of the
trials of these co-defendants.
The court in Norman also noted that non-represented defendants, who have
inadequate legal training, require extensive intervention and assistance from the court to
conduct ordinary court procedure. Norman noted that there is a tension between
handholding the defendant through all the procedures and simultaneously “remain[ing]
the arbiter”.113

C. A court may impose counsel either during the pre-trial phase or at any
time during the trial, and may consider evidence of the defendant’s
behavior before the trial began.
In deciding to impose counsel, Courts are not restricted to any one point in the
trial. Circumstances change throughout a trial, and the defendant who is capable and
cooperative one day may become gravely ill or uncontrollable the next.
In United States v. Brock, counsel was imposed upon the defendant based only on
his pre-trial behaviors, before the trial had even begun. The court justified this decision,
stating that the defendant’s pretrial behavior “was sufficient to allow the district judge to
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conclude that there was a strong indication that Brock would continue to be disruptive at
trial”.114
Milosevic complained about the timing with which the court imposed counsel
upon him, pointing out that the imposition came just as the defense was about to start its
case, but his objection did not sway the court.115
In Prosecutor v. Norman, the SCSL imposed counsel upon a defendant even
though the defendant was boycotting the trial. It found that the absence of the accused
defendant does not prevent the court from imposing counsel upon him and continuing the
trial without him, if that defendant has previously been part of the trial and has later
chosen not to participate.116
Not only may the decision to impose counsel come at any time of the trial, the
court may also consider evidence of the defendant’s behavior from any part of the trial, or
even his behavior outside the trial proceeding. In Prosecutor v. Seselj, the ICTY
considered evidence of the defendant’s pre-trial behavior when evaluating the risk of his
continued destructive behavior. They looked even to his actions and statements before he
arrived in the Hague.117
D. When a court imposes counsel upon a defendant, the accused retains
some power in the planning, strategy and execution of his or her case.
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Even when circumstances properly enable the court to curtail a defendant’s right
to self-representation, the defendant is not reduced to a passive role in his case. There are
several possibilities as to the defendant’s new role and his or her imposed counsel’s role,
but in any case, the defendant retains some power in the planning, strategy and execution
of his or her case. The ICTY has even asserted that the appointment of standby counsel
is not at all inconsistent with the right to self-representation.118
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Potential roles for the assigned counsel are diverse, and include both traditional
defense counsel and hybrid roles. The assigned counsel can take the form of standby
counsel. As defined in Seselj, standby counsel confer with the accused, create motions
and court documents, and are available in the courtroom as a protective measure in that
the court can call upon the standby counsel to question witnesses if the accused is doing
so improperly, or call upon the standby counsel to “take over the defence” completely if
the defendant’s conduct is overly disruptive under Rule 80(b)119.
The defendant’s role is also variable because, by default, he retains whatever
power is not assigned to the imposed counsel. In the US Supreme Court decision
McKaskle v. Wiggins, the appointment of counsel to the defendant against the defendant’s
wishes was upheld, but with the caveat that the defendant would be allowed to control the
content and direction of his defense, and that he be allowed to question or call witnesses
as long as he was “able and willing to abide by the rules of procedure and courtroom
protocol”.120
The ICTY has made similar rulings. In Prosecutor v. Krajisnik, it stated that the
defendant would be assigned counsel against his wishes, but would retain some ability to
question or call witnesses, especially after a successful “experimental” period.121 In
Prosecutor v. Milosevic, the ICTY Appeals Chamber upheld the trial court’s decision to
impose counsel on a partly incapacitated defendant, but did not uphold the specific roles
that the trial court had assigned to the appointed counsel and the defendant. The Appeals
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Court held that the court could not reduce Milosevic to a “visibly second-tier role in the
trial” and must ensure that the defendant’s role is diminished only to the minimum extent
necessary to compensate for the defendant’s deficiencies.122

E. The Potential for Abuse of the Court and Obstruction of the
Proceedings is Not Necessarily Extinguished When Counsel is
Imposed Upon the Defendant.
If a defendant is seriously committed to undermining the court in any way he can,
and if he feels he has nothing to lose in the trial process, because his guilty verdict is
certain, he can still find ways to be disruptive, despite the introduction of counsel.
The accused might retaliate against the court by refusing to cooperate or
communicate with the imposed counsel, even to the point that the fairness of his trial is
compromised. Counsel can help a trial to go more efficiently and fairly; the counselor
can be called upon to take over the questioning of a witness who would otherwise be
abused on the stand by the defendant; the counselor can be held to deadlines and
standards in the presentation of documents to the court. The counselor can also be
sanctioned, and his or her reputation is always on the line, encouraging the counselor to
keep the trial running as smoothly as possible. But if the defendant is antagonistic toward
the court and the imposed counsel, the counselor will have little control over the
defendant’s behavior.
When the ICTY imposed counsel upon defendant Seselj, the trial did not
transform into an orderly proceeding. Seselj’s counsel, Lazarevic, accused Seselj of
making unfounded accusations against him and his family. The attorney notified the
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court that he was suing Seselj in a domestic court.123 The ICTY considered the attorney’s
separate suit against his own client as sufficient conflict of interest to oust him from the
proceedings and replace him.124
ICTY defendant Blagojevic is another example of a defendant who was paired
with counsel against his will. Blagojevic and his assigned counsel, Michael Karnavas,
had a falling out, and Blagojevic “capriciously sought his removal.”125 Blagojevic’s
attempt to eject Karnavas from the case failed, and Karnavas remained as an unwanted
attorney. Boas suggests that Karnavas’s continued dedication to the case, and his
uninterrupted good defense work show “great courage” and stand as “an example of how
counsel might remain and represent an unwilling and uncooperative accused.”126
The accused may still be able to disrupt the proceedings, beyond boycotting or
ignoring his counsel. The defendant who has been forced to accept counsel still retains a
great deal of power in the planning and execution of his case, possibly including the
ability to address court or question witnesses. He may be able to engage in some of the
same disruptive behaviors that forced the court to assign counsel to him in the first place.
For example, Saddam Hussein was not self-represented in his trial before the Iraqi
High Tribunal, yet he managed to be very problematic in court.127 He sometimes
boycotted the trial, and at other times he insulted the judges repeatedly and launched into
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long speeches that had nothing to do with the case.128 One reason that he was able to
create so much disorder was that there exists in Iraq a procedural tradition, not embedded
in statutes or rules, that the accused may always engage witnesses once his counsel has
retired from questioning them, and that the accused may also address the court directly,
without needing to be on the stand.129 The Iraqi High Tribunal is a sort of hybrid court,
mainly of a domestic nature, and it honored this Iraqi tradition.130 Saddam used these
traditional rights to make irrelevant political speeches, insult the court, and prevent an
orderly trial.131
IV.

CONCLUSION

At least within the context of an adversarial, or non-inquisitorial, type of court, the
defendant’s right to self-representation is customary international law. While some
countries still hold that the right is almost absolute, a shift is taking place. More and
more restrictions are being placed upon the right to self-representation, even in common
law countries that once spoke of the right in absolute terms, like the United States.
Self-representation in an international war crimes trial, particularly if the defendant is
high profile, can be very troublesome. Without curtailing an uncooperative and
obstructionist defendant’s right to self-representation, the court will have little control
over outlandish behavior. Even cooperative, self-represented defendants can be difficult
because self-representation compromises the court’s role as arbiter. It requires the court
to continually assist some defendants, even to the point that it may act almost as part of
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the defense team. Besides blurring the role of arbiter, continual assistance of defendants
can be distracting for the court, which has other important work to do. The system works
better when defense counsel, not the court, takes the primary responsibility to submit
appropriate documents, reply to motions, and follow the rules of procedure in the
courtroom. A court that must handhold a defendant throughout the trial is doing itself a
disservice.
It is difficult but necessary to find balance between the court’s need to create a trial of
integrity and its desire to respect the rights of the defendant. But as Seselj has shown, a
court has many options available to fulfill its overarching responsibility of producing as
fair a trial as possible. These options include the abridgement or revocation of the
defendant’s right to self-representation.
Courts have flexibility in addressing the particular situations of each trial, and can
consider the defendant’s current and past behavior. Courts need not wait until years of
uncooperative behavior have damaged the court to justify the imposition of standby
counsel. Also, the court need not revoke all of the defendant’s powers. The defendant
can retain most of the rights he had before standby counsel was appointed, and then if his
behavior or capacity does not improve, more of the power to interact in court can shift to
the standby counsel. Courts cannot take away the defendant’s right to control the content
of his defense from behind the scenes, but they can control the manner in which the
defendant interacts with the court in the courtroom, and to the minimal extent necessary,
can restrict a defendant’s role in the trial.
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